One of the characteristics of a reinforcing loop is that, if left unchecked, it leads to powerful exponential growth. As any banker will gladly tell you, a dollar invested each week for 60 years will make you amazingly rich! But for situations that are less rosy, one of the problems is that escalation is very hard to stop once it gets going. A domestic squabble over a small thing can quickly grow to the point of destructive words and maybe even actions. Aware of the damage being wreaked, the partners may try to scale back their responses, but things can still spin out of control, as though the conflict has taken on a life of its own. When this same dynamic comes into play in the international arena between nations with nuclear weapons, it can have potentially catastrophic consequences.

Why is stopping escalation so hard? I think the problem is that small concessions aren’t enough; breaking the cycle takes big steps that go overboard in being generous to other side. Because of lack of trust or the desire to protect ourselves, we tend to tone down our rhetoric slightly—but not go too far. We seek to be conciliatory—but not to be seen as groveling. We make tentative moves toward finding a middle ground—but only as we define it.

Unfortunately, with the very real possibilities of miscommunication or misinterpretation, what one side considers to be a dramatic compromise may be viewed by the other as a hollow gesture. This kind of miscue can launch the reinforcing process all over again, often in a flash. Because people take away the impression that compromise isn’t possible, they aren’t as conciliatory in the future. Stress levels rise even further. These are reinforcing and amplifying elements. This is how wars that nobody wants can start and then gain their own momentum.

Big, Generous Actions

So how can we break free from this vicious cycle? As system dynamicist It is important to note that “generous actions” need not reflect a truly “generous spirit,” but can merely stem from the knowledge of the kind of response that is critical to averting disaster.

Embarking on this step requires trust, risk-taking, and courage. These are difficult requirements in a world with substantial complexity, time and perception delays, and communication problems. Further, if you don’t receive the desired response from the other side, then trust often decays, risk-taking becomes less aggressive, and courage turns to caution.

Real-World Examples

Having just returned from a peace delegation to Israel and Palestine, I have seen with my own eyes the damaging effects of decades of escalation. There have been a number of cycles of hurtful activity on both sides involving Palestinian protests and terrorism in response to repression, and Israeli repression and military action in response to Palestinian actions. This situation is clearly in a downward spiral, as exemplified by Israel’s recent construction of a “security fence”—as high as 8 meters in many places—that extends more than 700 kilometers within the West Bank. The sad irony is that, while this barrier and numerous security checkpoints may create the illusion of safety, by fueling anger and despair among the Palestinians, they may be boosting the escalation dynamic to a new, more deadly level— and increasing danger.

ESCALATION TEMPLATE

The basic causal loop structure of escalation has two balancing loops, as each party takes action to achieve its goal and move a bit ahead of its opponent. As the momentum swings back and forth between the two sides, the interaction of these balancing loops creates a figure-8 reinforcing loop.

“I would humbly suggest the Saudi king make four stops. His first stop should be to Al Aksa Mosque in East Jerusalem, the third holiest site in Islam. There, he, the custodian of Mecca and Medina, could reaffirm the Muslim claim to Arab East Jerusalem by praying at Al Aksa.

From there, he could travel to Ramallah and address the Palestinian parliament, making clear that the Abdullah initiative aims to give Palestinians the leverage to offer Israel peace with the whole Arab world in return for full withdrawal [from the occupied territories].

From there, King Abdullah could helicopter to Yad Vashem, the memorial to the six million Jews killed in the Holocaust. A visit there would seal the deal with Israelis and affirm that the Muslim world rejects the Holocaust denialism of Iran. Then he could go to the Israeli parliament and formally deliver his peace initiative.

Of course, I have no illusions about this. But is it any more illusory than thinking that the incrementalism of the last seven years is going to get anywhere? Now that’s a fantasy.”

This is perhaps an extreme example, but Freidman knows that something of this nature needs to happen. I am not a historian, but I suspect that examination of the underlying dynamics leading to the end of apartheid in South Africa or peace in Northern Ireland or the fall of the Berlin Wall, all of which occurred with surprising suddenness, would yield additional insight into the nature of big actions that reverse long-term escalation. It’s like washing the windows on a global scale!

Because the reinforcing process can so quickly transform a small, even unintentional gap between two parties into a wide chasm, understanding the dynamics can make us more sensitive to risks and more anxious to nip a situation in the bud when it is manageable. Likewise, when we are caught up in this powerful structure, knowing about the leverage in big, generous actions can make our perceptions more focused and deliberate and our responses more confident and effective. From the kitchen to the world of nations, such insight can be priceless in saving relationships and preventing wars.

David W. Packer is a founding member of the Systems Thinking Collaborative (www.stcollab.com). He holds a master’s degree from MIT, where he worked in the system dynamics group at the Sloan School, and is also a graduate of the Executive Program at the University of Virginia. David participated for many years in the growth of Digital Equipment Corporation and has served on the board of directors of the Home for Little Wanderers, Domestic Violence Services, Policy Council of the System Dynamics Society, and Pegasus Communications. His broad interest in bringing systems understanding to diverse issues is reflected in this article.

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• An epidemic accelerates in proportion to the number of people exposed, which in turn increases the likelihood that the epidemic will spread even further.
• Downsizing is likely to reduce an executive’s ability to generate revenue (not just costs), which in turn decreases profits and increases pressure to downsize yet again.
• Acts of violence perpetrated by one party in a war stimulate acts of revenge by the other party, which in turn lead to violent retaliation by the first party and an ongoing escalation by both sides.

Although people are easily caught in vicious cycles, they often do not see these cycles as endless spirals and do not know how to escape the dynamic.

This article:

• Describes an easy way to identify vicious cycles that people are caught in;
• Explains a four-step process to transform this dynamic into an engine of success instead of failure;
• Will expand your thinking beyond simple vicious cycles to enrich your understanding of common problems and identify specific interventions for complex systems.

Doom Looping

One easy way to identify vicious cycles we are caught in is called “doom looping,” originally developed by Jennifer Kemeny. Doom looping has four steps:

1. Identify a problem symptom that concerns you because it seems to get worse and worse over time. For example, your symptom might be morale problems.
2. Identify three immediate and independent causes of the problem symptom. For example, three immediate causes of morale problems might be a difficult manager, lack of career opportunities, and job pressures and stress.
3. Clarify three immediate and independent consequences of the growing problem symptom. For example, three immediate consequences of morale problems are turnover, quality problems, and performance issues.
4. Finally, show how at least one of the consequences exacerbates at least one of the causes. The connection might be direct or indirect. For example, the consequence of turnover is that it increases workload for key personnel, which in turn increases job pressures and stress, thereby increasing morale problems and turnover even further (see “Vicious Cycles”). This dynamic is a vicious cycle or, in systems thinking parlance, a reinforcing feedback loop.

VICIOUS CYCLES

One easy way to identify vicious cycles we are caught in is called “Doom Looping.”

Transforming Vicious Cycles

Once you have identified a vicious cycle, you can look for where to break the cycle and ideally transform it into a positive engine of growth. This involves four steps:

1. Identify at least one link in the vicious cycle that is governed by people’s beliefs or assumptions instead of hard-wired into the system. This is a link that can be broken. To clarify this link, ask, “Is this cause-effect link inevitable, or can it be influenced by changing how people think and behave?”

   Example: “Do morale problems necessarily have to lead to high turnover?” Here the answer is “No,” because the existence of morale problems could just as well stimulate the active engagement of your best people—the ones most likely to leave first when things get bad—in turning around the organization. By contrast, once turnover occurs (especially of good people), the workload of key personnel is likely to increase and, as a result, so will job pressures and stress, and then morale problems. These links are more hardwired into the vicious cycle.

2. Redirect the causal factor in the weak link by creating a new goal. Ask, “What do we want to accomplish when this causal factor appears?”

   Example: “We want to establish a highly effective organization led by our best people at all levels.”

3. Clarify the corrective actions required to bridge the gap between where you are and the new goal.

   Example: “In order to increase morale and achieve the goal of an effective organization led by our best people at all levels, we will ask these people to reassess the organization’s strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities and lead task forces to capitalize on the most critical areas.

4. Implement reinforcing actions that sustain the new momentum. Because managers tend to be pulled by multiple demands, they often take their attention off of a new initiative once it appears to be moving forward. In order to ensure that the change in direction is sustained, it is important to implement actions that reinforce this direction over time.

   Example: The task force leaders can benefit from individual coaching and team learning meetings that enable them to overcome organizational resistance, deal with surprises, and increase each others’ effectiveness. This process should be followed by timely implementation of their recommendations and adjustments in the organizational infrastructure to support new ways of working.

Addressing More Complex Dynamics

Because vicious cycles are relatively easy to identify when things go wrong, we are tempted to see them everywhere we look. However, focusing on many vicious cycles tends to confuse people and limit their ability to identify effective interventions. There are two ways to make sense of multiple vicious cycles and key in on high-leverage interventions:

• The first is to simplify multiple vicious cycles by identifying the four to seven variables that people believe are most critical to the problem. Next, depict how these variables interact with each other by drawing no more than two or three loops. Once you have simplified the number of loops, use the above method for breaking and transforming vicious cycles to develop an intervention strategy.
• The second approach is to recognize that vicious cycles tend to disguise and dominate more complex dynamics. These dynamics can often be depicted initially as systems archetypes. Archetypes provide a rich, comprehensive explanation of what is happening while still being easy to understand. In addition to providing clarity that is both sophisticated and accessible, systems archetypes enable people to target more specific high-leverage interventions.

Example: If a vicious cycle is created when people use a quick fix to reduce a problem symptom, draw the “Fixes That Backfire” (also known as the “Fixes That Fail”) archetype, and apply interventions for producing a sustainable solution (see, for example, Systems Archetypes Basics: From Story to Structure by Daniel H. Kim andVirginia Anderson, Pegasus Communications, 1998). If one or more vicious cycles increase dependence on a quick fix and undermine your ability to implement a more fundamental long-term solution, show the “Shifting the Burden” archetype and use interventions designed to support this solution.

Other dynamics where vicious cycles tend to dominate include:

• Success to the Successful—one part of the system performs better and better over time at the expense of decreasing success of another part;
• Accidental Adversaries—the unintended consequences of actions taken by two potential collaborators undermine each other’s effectiveness;
• Competing Goals—efforts to achieve too many goals for too many different parties reduce their ability to accomplish any goal satisfactorily;
• Escalation—two parties continuously amplify their activities to defeat the other without ever achieving a sustainable advantage.

In sum: Identifying vicious cycles is often a great place to start applying systems thinking to chronic, complex problems. At the same time, people can often gain richer insight and even greater leverage by testing for and depicting the systems archetypes that produce these cycles.

David Peter Stroh is a principal of Applied Systems Thinking and founder and principal of www.bridgewaypartners.com. David is an expert in applying systems thinking to organizational and social change. You can contact him at dstroh@appliedsystemsthinking.com.

This article is adapted with permission from the Applied Systems Thinking Library. © Applied Systems Thinking 2006

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While this scenario is highly improbable, it illustrates how facile our minds usually are at seeing patterns. The human brain is able to assemble trillions of pieces of data into recognizable objects and relationships that allow us to navigate through the world. Similarly, our minds are good at storing and retrieving linked chains of cause and effect. For example, it doesn’t take a child very long to realize that touching a hot stove means hurting a finger. Without this fundamental ability to recognize familiar patterns, every moment would be a new experience, and we could never learn from the past.

In order to see such patterns quickly, however, we must have reference structures that help us recognize similar situations. Such references allow us to go beyond the details of a situation and see larger patterns (e.g., touching hot objects will cause pain). Systems archetypes provide a powerful set of reference structures that allow us to see beyond the level of individual events in our organizations to the larger forces that are at work.

Seeing the Structures Behind Events

Once we are able to look beyond individual events and begin to see the underlying structural patterns that are producing them, we can make more fundamental improvements in our organizational systems. In particular, systems archetypes—a set of templates for identifying common patterns of behavior—can help in this process.

The “Drifting Goals” archetype represents a pattern of gradually eroding goals caused by two balancing processes that are trying to achieve equilibrium between a goal and the actual state.

The archetype diagrams provide a visual representation of a pattern of linked causes and effects. For example, “Drifting Goals” describes a pattern of gradually eroding goals that occurs over a long period of time. The storyline of the archetype says that if there is a gap between a desired goal and our actual performance, we can close the gap in one of two ways—by taking action to reach the goal, or by lowering our goal to be more in line with the current reality (see “‘Drifting Goals’Archetype”). The critical difference between these two approaches is that lowering the goal immediately closes the gap, whereas corrective actions usually take time. The tendency, therefore, is to let the goal gradually drift until a crisis occurs that focuses organizational attention on the problem.

Mapping out the specific loop structures of “Drifting Goals” and other archetypes helps us identify the structures creating the behavior patterns that we observe. We can then use the structural pattern template to see similarities across seemingly diverse situations. For example, “Drifting Goals” shows a pattern of gradually eroding goals caused by two balancing processes that are trying to achieve equilibrium between the goal and current reality. The problems of lengthening delivery times or an increasing aging chain of receivables are both very different, yet each demonstrates a pattern of drifting goals and can be addressed using similar corrective actions. This ability to transfer lessons from one setting to another enables us to accelerate learning across the organization.

Seeing Loops and Nothing Less Than Loops

By using systems archetypes as structural patterns, we can begin to see the world in terms of interrelated factors. Loops, not the component variables, become the smallest unit of analysis. We are no longer satisfied with explanations listing isolated factors as causal agents. Instead, we want to know how those factors relate to other parts of the system.

FROM FACTORS TO LOOPS

Looking at a situation from a “Limits to Success” structural pattern forces us to go beyond simply listing success factors. We must actually map them into reinforcing and balancing loops. For example, new product introductions lead to higher sales and boost revenue (R1), but revenue growth puts a strain on the organization’s internal systems, which leads to lower service quality and, ultimately, lower sales (B2).

If we are looking at a rapid growth situation, for example, and are concerned about becoming caught in a “Limits to Success” archetype, we might begin by looking at the growth drivers. In such situations, it is common to list linear factors (A causes B causes C, etc.). Mapping the situation through an archetype, however, forces us to map the factors into a loop that tells a coherent story. For example, if we identified new product introductions and service quality as key success factors, we could incorporate those into the “Limits to Success” diagram. This diagram includes both the engines of growth and the potential limits to that growth (see “From Factors to Loops”).

In working through this process, we are, in essence, looking for loop structures that capture a fuller story. In the case of “Limits to Success,” we are looking for a structural pattern of one or more reinforcing loops that are generating growth, coupled with one or more balancing loops that are slowing down the growth. Through continual practice with the archetypes, we can develop our perceptual capabilities and move from seeing isolated factors, to seeing loops, to seeing whole archetypal structures.

Visual Structures

The value of a clear and unambiguous description of a complex situation can’t be overemphasized. When talking about complex organizational issues, it is easy for a team to stray from the main topic into many interesting details that are not very relevant to the issue at hand. Without the clarity of focus provided by a common picture, the conversation can turn into a storytelling fest where much is shared and little is actually accomplished. At its worst, those discussions can turn into counterproductive finger-pointing sessions.

The archetypes, however, can help focus a group’s attention on the heart of an issue by providing a structural pattern and a process for identifying and drawing out each of the requisite loops of that pattern. Diagramming an archetype provides an explicit visual form that can depersonalize issues by focusing attention on a system’s structure, not on the individual players in the system. In addition, the language of links and loops provides a disciplined way of specifying relationships between factors by identifying them as part of a reinforcing or balancing loop.

The “Archetypes as Structural Patterns” chart shows the loop structures of each of the archetypes. Highlighting the basic reinforcing and/or balancing loop patterns of the archetypes provides a starting point for identifying those dynamics in our own organizations. This chart can help us see broader structural patterns at work, rather than viewing each event as a unique individual occurrence.

ARCHETYPES AS STRUCTURAL PATTERNS

Seeing Structures Across Diverse Situations

As we internalize the structural patterns of each of the archetypes, we begin to see the world in terms of larger “systemic chunks” instead of unrelated bits and pieces. When we see a competitor responding to one of our company’s pricing promotions, for example, we won’t just see it as a one-time reaction, but will recognize how each player is operating in his or her own balancing loop process that is perhaps part of a larger “Escalation” structure.

A Chinese philosopher once said, “One cannot step into the same river twice.” Although the river is slightly different each time we dip into it, for most practical purposes we can treat it as if it were the same. Likewise, from a systemic perspective, we can look beyond the myriad details that makes each situation look unique and recognize the underlying structural patterns that produce the same dynamics in a variety of situations. This ability to leverage learning across many different situations is one of the most powerful benefits of the systems thinking approach, and one of the most significant distinguishing characteristics of the human mind.

Daniel H. Kim is co-founder of Pegasus Communications, founding publisher of The Systems Thinker newsletter, and a consultant, facilitator, teacher, and public speaker committed to helping problem-solving organizations transform into learning organizations.

Colleen P. Lannon is co-founder of Pegasus Communications, Inc.

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The better we understand the structure of a system, the better we can predict the future behavior of that system.

Another deep-rooted assumption is that past behavior is a good predictor of future behavior—hence our never-ending attempts to forecast, anticipate, and otherwise guess at future outcomes by looking at historical data. Without a deeper understanding of the underlying structures that produce the observed behaviors, forecasts fail when we need them the most—when the future deviates from the past.

Inaccurate forecasts stem from two causes: either we do not understand the mechanisms governing the actions we are trying to predict, or the situations themselves are inherently unpredictable. In the latter case, there isn’t much we can do other than take our best shot with whatever methods seem to produce the best results. But before we throw up our hands in despair, we should be careful to differentiate between true uncertainty and predetermined elements—those things we can predict if we have an adequate understanding of the underlying structure.

Scenario Planning

Planners at Royal Dutch Shell recognized the importance of distinguishing between true uncertainty and predetermined elements as part of the scenario planning process. They defined a predetermined element as an event that has already occurred—or most certainly will occur—but the consequences of which have not yet materialized. For example, if there is an auto accident on a major highway at rush hour, we can predict that traffic jams within the city and ripple effects on secondary roads will be the predetermined outcomes of that event. The structure of the system— number of lanes, alternative routes, speed limits, rush hour traffic volume, population density— makes the outcome very predictable. Identifying such predetermined elements is fundamental to the planning process, because it allows us to predict future outcomes based on the structure of the current situation.

Structure-Behavior Link

The better we understand the structure of a system, the better we can predict the future behavior of that system. This is one of the most important principles of systems thinking—structure, to a large extent, determines behavior. Although there may be uncertainty about the exact timing and duration of the outcome, the nature and eventuality of it is clear. Knowing this, we can greatly improve our ability to influence the behavior of a system.

Together, systems archetypes and Behavior Over Time diagrams (BOTs) can help us identify predetermined outcomes of a particular situation. Systems archetypes can help us see the structures within a complex system, while Behavior Over Time diagrams offer a glimpse into the expected behavior of that structure over time.

Identifying Predetermined Elements

REINFORCING GROWTH WITH NEW PRODUCTS

A reinforcing dynamic of new products increasing revenue, which is then invested in additional new products (R1), will initially produce a growth curve.

For example, in many companies, new product development is the main engine of growth (see “Reinforcing Growth with New Products”). As new products are released, customer orders and revenues increase, which provides more funds to pump back into new product development (R1). In this situation, our sales data would show that we are on a healthy growth curve, and most forecasts would predict more of the same. If we look at the situation from a “Limits to Success” perspective, however, we can go beyond straight line projections by better understanding the structural forces at play. In reality, there are many different possible outcomes that can never be predicted by historical data alone (see “Multiple Futures”). Revenues could grow at a slower rate (F2), plateau (F3), or collapse (F4). Given these possibilities, what kind of prediction can we make for future outcomes? The answer is determined not by looking at past data, but by looking at the underlying structure.

MULTIPLE FUTURES

There are many possible outcomes for revenues, given our current reinforcing structure of increasing product offerings: forecasted growth (F1), continued growth at a slower rate (F2), plateau (F3), or decline (F4).

When we understand the structural landscape, we can better distinguish between uncertainty and predetermined elements. In a “Limits to Success” structure, we would look for balancing loops that the growth in revenues might trigger (see “Identifying Predetermined Consequences of Limits”).

For example as customer orders grow, the organizational infrastructures needed to service them also grows. As more people are hired, the organizational complexity increases and places an additional managerial burden on those responsible for developing products. If the company’s way of managing its product development effort does not change with the changing needs (which is often the case in a fast-growth environment), a decline in new products is a predetermined consequence of the “Limits to Success” structure. The more the company tries to push harder on the growing action, the stronger the slowing action will become, as long as the structure of the management capacity limit remains unchanged.

From Historical Behavior to Archetype

Behavioral charts can also provide a starting point for selecting an appropriate archetype to use, since each archetype is associated with a particular dominant behavior mode that is characteristic of its structure. For example, imagine you are a marketing manager in charge of a new product launch. You have been running a series of campaigns over the past year, and sales have grown steadily. Last quarter, however, you noticed that the growth in sales was beginning to decline. This quarter you increased your marketing efforts, but it seemed to have little impact.

IDENTIFYING PREDETERMINED CONSEQUENCES OF LIMITS

The “Limits to Success” structure suggests that there are potential balancing processes that could limit future growth. For example, as the organizational infrastructure grows to service the increasing orders, product developers might have less time to devote to creating new products (B2). The result may be a decline in products and a consequent decline in orders (R1)

The historical pattern of behavior can offer clues that help identify possible archetypal structures, which then allows us to predict future behavior given the system structure. It is an iterative process. For example, the historical data of sales growing and then plateauing suggests a “Limits to Success” archetype may be at work. Having identified a “Limits to Success” structure, we can use BOT diagrams to flesh out the particular limits affecting our sales growth. How does the volume of campaigns seem to affect sales over time? Are there pressures building in the organization as a result of the growth? What does the production capacity look like over time? Is the size of the market growing or stagnating? Charting these factors over time can offer insight into the particular balancing processes that need to be addressed in order to eliminate potential limits to growth before they affect future sales.

Or suppose you are a new plant manager of a processed food company and you notice that a oncepopular product has been declining steadily in sales. When you ask other employees for their picture of the situation, they tell you that consumer tastes have changed and the product does not have as much appeal as it used to. The declining sales coupled with a declining level of investment into the product itself, however, makes you wonder if something else is going on. This behavior over time suggests that a “Drifting Goals” archetype may be at work.

Creating (Not Forecasting) Your Future

This link between structure and behavior is critical in our systems thinking worldview. Linking each archetype with a specific set of behavior patterns can help us see into the future with a different set of eyes. We can then see more clearly the difference between true uncertainty and predetermined events that have yet to unfold. By identifying and working on the underlying structures that produce the behaviors, we can better predict the future by helping to create it instead of just trying to forecast it.

Daniel H. Kim is co-founder of Pegasus Communications, founding publisher of The Systems Thinker newsletter, and a consultant, facilitator, teacher, and public speaker committed to helping problem-solving organizations transform into learning organizations.

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Applying archetypes such as “Shifting the Burden,” “Fixes That Fail,” and “Limits to Growth” to a specific problem can be a confusing and difficult process, especially if you believe there is one “right” way to use them. We can actually talk about using the archetypes in three different ways:

1. as different lenses;
2. as structural pattern templates;
3. as dynamic scripts (or theories).

By distinguishing between these different types of use, we can focus on increasing our capability in any one of the three ways, rather than being frustrated by trying to do everything at once. In this article, we will focus on using archetypes as lenses for gaining different perspectives on an issue.

I’ll See It When I Believe It

Many of us at one time or another have said “I’ll believe it when I see it,” suggesting that we have more faith in things that we can see and touch. If, for example, there are 100 cases of beer in inventory, you and I can count them and both agree on that number. On the other hand, if we ask why we have 100 cases, our opinions will likely be very different and may be colored by our personal beliefs.

For example, if I think the 100 cases of inventory are a result of poor production scheduling, I will tend to find evidence to support that view. Or, if I think that individual error is responsible for overstocking, I will focus on finding individuals to blame rather than look for any larger systemic forces that may be at work. We don’t believe what we see as much as we see what we believe. Because we can easily fall into this trap, having tools such as the archetypes to help us look at broader systemic issues can be helpful for expanding our perspective.

Seeing Through Systemic Lenses

In many ways, using an archetype is like putting on a pair of eyeglasses. If we look at a situation through the lens of the “Shifting the Burden” storyline, we will ask different questions and focus on different things than if we were using the “Tragedy of the Commons” archetype. It is not a question of which is “right,” but, rather, what different insight each archetype offers.

Using the archetypes as lenses requires a basic understanding of the main lessons, key elements, and outcomes or high-leverage actions that are embodied in each archetype (see “Systems Archetypes at a Glance,” August 2011). This level of understanding allows us to go into a situation, identify potential storylines at work, explore their implications, and gain some initial understanding of the problem under study.

Boat Buyback Dilemma

For example, consider the problem of fish depletion in coastal waters. In order to address the dangers of overfishing and eventual depletion of certain species, the U. S. government launched a pilot program to buy boats back from fishermen.

The overfishing problem has all the classic features of a “Tragedy of the Commons” archetype (see “Too Many Boats on the Horizon,” September 1994). A large number of players are competing for a single resource. The incentive is for each individual fisherman to catch as many fish as possible. However, the combined total of their efforts will eventually hurt everyone, as fish stocks become depleted. The irony of the situation is that despite the devastation in the long term, it is in no individual’s interest to stop fishing in the short term. The leverage in a “Tragedy of the Commons” structure is to have a single governing authority manage the commons. From this perspective, the boat buyback program can be seen as an appropriate role for the government as resource manager.

TRYING ON DIFFERENT EYEGLASSES

If we look at the same situation through the lens of another archetype, however, we can see some other potentially relevant issues. For example, we know that the storyline of a “Shifting the Burden” archetype is that a problem symptom cries out to be fixed. In such situations, we have a tendency to implement a solution that alleviates the symptom in the short term rather than to invest in a more lasting solution. Implementing a quick fix reduces the pressure to examine the deeper structures that may be at the root of the problem.

From this perspective, we might be concerned that the government bailout will send the signal that Uncle Sam will provide a safety net whenever the fishing industry develops over-capacity. Therefore, when fishing stocks replenish, fishermen may be less concerned about taking risks and expanding their fleet. Over time, the fix may become so entrenched that it will turn into a permanent Band-Aid that will shift the wrong kind of responsibility to the government. In this case, the “Shifting the Burden” archetype reveals how the short-term solution shifts the burden of risk and over-extension from the individual to the government.

Productive Conversations and Deeper Inquiry

The buyback example illustrates how the archetypes can be used to gain different perspectives on an issue. Rather than spending time figuring out which archetype best matches your particular situation or trying to get your arrows to go in the right direction, you can use the archetypes to begin a general inquiry into the problem.

To see which lenses may be relevant, try using the questions listed in the accompanying sidebar to see what insight each archetype can add to your problem (see “Trying on Different Eyeglasses”). Once you have selected the most pertinent archetype(s), you can use those archetype(s) to develop action plans that will address the problem systemically.

Looking at the world through the lenses of archetypes puts our primary focus on systemic structures and not on individuals. This is particularly important at the initial stage of problem diagnosis, because it enables you to engage people in the process more easily without triggering defensiveness. This process of “trying on” different stories leads us to ask different kinds of questions and, ultimately, enables us to have more productive conversations.

Daniel H. Kim is co-founder of Pegasus Communications, founding publisher of The Systems Thinker newsletter, and a consultant, facilitator, teacher, and public speaker committed to helping problem-solving organizations transform into learning organizations.

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The first question seemed important because it appeared that both sides had been moving toward a peaceful settlement since 1993, when they signed the Oslo Accords. Certain parts of the West Bank had been returned to full Palestinian control on an agreed-upon path to Palestinian statehood, and the newly formed Palestinian Authority had publicly announced its acceptance of Israel’s right to exist. Just two months before we moved to Israel, Prime Minister Ehud Barak had made the strongest Israeli offer yet for completing negotiations and paving the way for a Palestinian state comprising most of the West Bank and Gaza—although, much to the surprise of most Israelis, the offer was rejected.

The second question seems almost inevitable in human relations when things do not go the way people want them to. Instead of considering our responsibility for creating certain situations, we quickly seek to blame others. Moreover, in this case, there were plenty of likely candidates: Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader who turned down Barak’s breakthrough offer; Ariel Sharon, the Israeli right-wing leader whose visit to the Al Aqsa mosque complex sparked the Palestinian riots; Barak, for appearing to force the Palestinian leadership into a corner and refusing to meet with Arafat face-to-face at Camp David; and President Clinton, for appearing to side with Israel against the Palestinians during these same negotiations.

As unavoidable as these two questions are, I believe they are the wrong ones. As a systems thinker trained to look for the non-obvious interdependencies producing chronic problems, I found it pointless to ask “Why now?” about a conflict that has been going on for anywhere from 30-50 years at a minimum to nearly 4,000 years at the extreme. Similarly, it made little sense to blame anyone when the conflict has extended well beyond the political if not physical lifetimes of most of the leaders mentioned above and other participants in the current crisis.

Instead, I began to ask a different set of questions:

• Why does this problem persist despite people’s extensive efforts to solve it?
• Why do Israelis invest so much to increase their sense of security, yet feel so insecure?
• Why do Palestinians, despite enduring the loss of lives and extreme economic hardship, gain so little of the respect and sovereignty they try so hard to achieve?
• Why is it difficult for those people on both sides who want a workable compromise to gain sufficient support for solutions they perceive as possible?
• Where is the leverage in the conflict, that is, what can people do to produce a sustainable systemwide solution?

The field of systems thinking is especially effective for enabling people to understand why they have been unsuccessful in solving chronic problems despite their best efforts. While a systems view can’t fully answer these questions, it can illuminate how people think—and the consequences of their thoughts and actions on the results they achieve—in ways that can help them see and achieve sustainable new solutions. By understanding the exact nature of the vicious circles we have been trapped in, we can create new patterns of relationships that serve us better. I set about to apply systems thinking to the Middle East crisis to see if I could shed light on possible ways out of the ongoing tragedy.

A Four-Stage Cycle

My view is that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict proceeds through a pattern of four stages: 1. Both sides fight for the right to exist. 2. The tension escalates. 3. Pressure leads to negotiations. 4. Peace efforts break down.

When peace efforts break down, the two sides cycle back to the first stage and intensify their fight for the right to exist (see “A Cycle of Violence”). From a systemic perspective, this pattern of behavior indicates that the “solutions” that the two parties are employing are unintentionally making the problem worse, or at least perpetuating it.

1. Both Sides Fight for the Right to Exist. What makes the Israeli-Palestinian conflict so intractable is that both sides see themselves battling to establish their basic right to exist. Israelis and Palestinians have become ardent enemies because each claims the same land. While some voices on each side acknowledge the right of the other to exist and are willing to exchange land for peace, others— often the more dominant voices— deny this right and refuse to negotiate. As a result, many ask, “How can coexistence be an option when the other side challenges our right to exist?”

Israel’s fears about its existence are justified by past events. The country came into being in 1948, shortly after one-third of the world’s Jews were exterminated in World War II. Immediately after it was founded, Israel was threatened by five surrounding Arab states, which vowed to “drive the Jews into the sea.” The Arabs felt that the partition proposed by the British and agreed on by the U. N. took land away from Arabs who had lived there for generations. Border raids by Egypt and Syria led to additional wars in 1956, 1967, and 1973. To protect its northern border, Israel occupied southern Lebanon from 1982 to 2000.

Israelis interpret many Palestinian actions as proof that the Palestinians do not recognize their right to exist. For example, the current Intifada, the Palestinians’ demand for the full right of return of its refugees to their homeland in what is now Israel, and continued anti-Semitic incidents abroad remind them of their vulnerability and the need for a Jewish state.

Meanwhile, the Palestinian people have never controlled their own destiny. The Ottoman Empire controlled their land for 400 years. The British took over in 1917 and ruled Palestine until 1948. In the Israeli War of Independence, an estimated 600,000 Palestinian refugees fled parts of Palestine that were later absorbed by Israel. Their numbers, including descendants, have now swelled into the millions. Jordan took over rule of the Palestinian West Bank from the British and held it until 1967, when Israel won that territory during the Six-Day War. Since then, Israel has established, expanded, and consistently defended settlements in the West Bank—often land lived on for centuries by Palestinians. Palestinians have frequently received a hostile reception through-out the Arab world. Since 1970, their attempts to resettle first in Jordan and then in Egypt and Syria were largely denied. Palestinians who have established themselves in Lebanon cannot practice professions. The only country that currently recognizes Palestinians as citizens is Jordan. Many suffer in refugee camps throughout the region, hoping to return to the lands they were forced to flee.

In their efforts to assert their right to exist, most Palestinians and Israelis will only consider two options: One is to negotiate an agreement of peaceful coexistence that divides the land of Palestine into two viable states; the other is to try to maintain or wrest control of all of the land at the expense of the other party. For a long time, many on both sides seemed to favor the first alternative, despite the powerful influence of extremists acting to achieve the second. But the profound mistrust the Israelis and Palestinians have developed for each other has caused more people on both sides to be drawn to the second alternative, despite the costs involved.

Two powerful factors entice both sides to fight for control of all the land: threat and desire. For most Israelis, the primary threat is to their security. Since 1967, the country’s policies have also been fueled by the desire of a powerful minority of religious Jews to retain control over the historical Jewish lands of Judea and Samaria, which constitute much of the West Bank. Israel’s response to threats to its security, as well as to pressures from the religious right, has been to control Palestinian movements through-out the territory through blockades, check points, and permits—actions that might be consider edmilitarily defensible but that are often implemented in ways that feel humiliating to the Palestinians. Israel has conducted targeted assassinations, bombed strategic Palestinian infrastructure, appropriated additional land to protect the settlers, defended the violent acts of some settlers, and killed civilians when under attack.

For Palestinians, the threat to their existence involves not just the lack of a homeland but the lack of respect they perceive from others. They feel ignored for the losses they have incurred and demeaned by both the actions and broken promises of the Israelis. Their anger at their history of mistreatment by foreign rulers, fanned by an Israeli occupation of the West Bank that the U. N. considers illegal (U. N. Resolution 242 defines the West Bank as “occupied territory”), leads them to demand respect as well as sovereignty. Furthermore, although Palestinian moderates would accept a viable state that has contiguous borders within the West Bank, comprises almost all of the West Bank and Gaza, and includes East Jerusalem as its capital, many Palestinians dream of reclaiming all of the land of their forebears—a reclamation that would result in the elimination of Israel.

Because their military position is weak relative to Israel’s, Palestinians fight through sniper attacks, verbal incitement, and suicide bombings against civilians. They justify their reliance on violence by observing that, in the past, Israel has not kept its promises unless it was physically provoked. For example, many view Israel’s decision to remove all of its soldiers from southern Lebanon in the spring of 2000 as a response to the violent resistance of Hezbollah fighters. Palestinian leaders also maintain strict controls over the information available to their own people—for example, by denying Israel’s existence in student textbooks and maps—and incite refugees to believe that they will one day reclaim all of their land.

A CYCLE OF VIOLENCE

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict proceeds through a pattern of four stages: Both sides fight for the right to exist; the tension escalates; pressure leads to negotiations; and peace efforts break down (R1). When peace efforts break down, the two sides cycle back to the first stage. This pattern of behavior indicates that the “solutions” that the two parties are employing are unintentionally making the problem worse, or at least perpetuating it.

2. The Tension Escalates. Over time, both sides have grown increasingly dependent on the strategy of retaliation (see “Dependence on Retaliation”). As one side gains a temporary advantage in its battle for legitimacy, the other acts to regain its own advantage. This pattern of escalation manifests in several ways:

• Israel uses military force and constraints on Palestinians’ movement to retaliate for Palestinian actions.
• Palestinians perpetrate violence against Israeli citizens and encourage their people to deny Israel’s right to exist.
• Each side perceives itself as a victim of the other’s aggression instead of seeing how its own actions contribute to the escalating conflict.

In the short term, each group’s strategies to claim its right to exist succeed. Through their containment policies, Israelis reaffirm, “They cannot force us to leave.” Through violent resistance, Palestinians reaffirm, “They will have to take us seriously.” In the long term, however, both sides fail to see the unintended consequences of their actions: They only increase the feelings of threat experienced by the other side, motivating them to act to reduce these attacks and regain their own sense of legitimacy—even as the loss of life and other costs increase.

For example, Israeli actions have increased economic hardship for Palestinians, deepened their feelings of humiliation and indignation, and led to significant losses of life. (According to U. N. estimates, as of December 2001,15 months after the Al Aqsa Intifada began, approximately 800 Palestinians had been killed, and the Palestinian economy was losing $11 million per day. The death toll has climbed with the recent escalation in violence on both sides.) In response, the Palestinians have become more unified and motivated to take even bolder actions; suicide bombings now occur several times a week. In the words of Jibril Rajoub, head of preventive security for the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, many Palestinians feel that “We have nothing left to lose.” In turn, greater resistance has only served to increase Israel’s determination to defend all of the land. An editorial in the Jerusalem Post states, “What must be defeated is the Hezbollah model—the idea that if you kill a few Israelis for long enough, they will get tired and leave.”

DEPENDENCE ON RETALIATION

Both sides have grown increasingly dependent on retaliation in response to threats to their right to exist (B2). In the long term, this strategy only increases the feelings of threat experienced by the other side (R4) and undermines the fundamental solution—negotiations for peaceful coexistence (R5). Third parties contribute to the conflict when they take sides (R6).

This cycle of retaliation is further compounded by the fact that both parties perceive themselves as victims of forces beyond their control. Palestinians claim they are victims of Israeli aggression; Israelis feel besieged by the entire Arab world. Each side emphasizes how the other’s actions hurt it while ignoring how its own actions hurt the other party. Because the self-perception of powerlessness is so deeply ingrained in the psyches of both peoples, it is very difficult for them to perceive that they have now become aggressors as well as victims. Each fails to see their own responsibility for increasing the levels of threat they experience—and fails to consider actions they might take to reduce these threats.

3. Pressure Leads to Negotiations. Only when the loss of life and resources incurred by both sides reaches a critical point do people begin to question the viability of resolving the conflict by force. In tandem with changes in the larger geopolitical forces affecting the region, this questioning eventually prompts a renewal of peace negotiations. We have seen this cycle occur several times, for example, when the failure of the first Intifada and the fall of the Soviet Union led to meetings in Madrid in 1991 and the Oslo Accords in 1993, and when, after the assassination of staunch peace advocate Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 and the extremism of the hardline government of Benyamin Netanyahu, Israelis elected the more liberal Barak in 1999.

Many on both sides believed they had reached a potential breakthrough in negotiations when, at Camp David in the summer of 2000, Barak offered the Palestinians most of the West Bank and East Jerusalem—an offer that Arafat rejected. Even after the Camp David meeting dissolved and the Al Aqsa Intifada began, parties on both sides continued to meet. At Taba in January 2001, they came very close to an agreement that many on both sides believe will eventually be the basis for a negotiated settlement.

4. Peace Efforts Break Down. Despite signs of a significant breakthrough on the most difficult issues, all peace efforts have inevitably broken down. Long-term dependence on destructive ways of resolving the conflict have led to profound mistrust and hatred. This hostility undermines the peace process in two fundamental ways. First, it decreases commitment by both sides to pursuing peaceful coexistence and strengthens people’s dreams of recovering all of the land. Second, it weakens the trust-building process by leading to a series of conditions, mixed messages, and broken promises.

Because of the build-up of mistrust and hatred, many people believe that a peace agreement can only be reached with the aid of international brokers—both at the negotiating table and on the ground thereafter. However, using brokers is problematic because each group tries to get the third parties to take sides—something the international community is not immune to doing. The United States has historically sided with Israel, and the European Community has generally sided with the Palestinian cause. As a result, both Israelis and Palestinians succeed in deflecting responsibility for the conflict and perpetuating the cycles of blame and victimization, rather than being accountable for their own destructive actions.

Extremist Actions

Remarkably, despite all of these barriers, at times the peace process appears to move forward. After the Oslo Accords, Israel ceded parts of the West Bank to Palestinian control, and the Palestinian leadership arrested Palestinian extremists. Informal dialogues as well as more formal negotiations on common issues such as water management grew, and people on both sides believed that peace could be achieved. Even after the Al Aqsa Intifada had raged for nearly a year, the worldwide coalition developed after September 11 to fight global terrorism gave both Israelis and Palestinians hope that the international community would finally succeed in getting them to agree to a sensible and honorable peace.

But no matter how intelligently and well designed a peace agreement may be, some people will perceive themselves as losers. Effective compromise is likely to mean that Israel will surrender most of the West Bank and all of Gaza and accept some symbolic right of return for Palestinians. In exchange, the Palestinians would recognize that Israel has the right to retain control over the remainder of the territory. In this scenario, Israeli settlers and right wingers would have to give up their homes and their dream of control over the promised lands of Judea and Samaria. Palestinian losers would include radical groups and refugees who have survived in terrible conditions in camps and who still dream of reclaiming all of the former Palestine.

To extremist groups on both sides, a compromise is unacceptable. When peace appears too near, they strike the ultimate blow to its realization. For example, the murder of nearly 30 Palestinians in a mosque by Israeli settler Baruch Goldstein is one of several Israeli actions that disrupted progress on the Oslo Accords. Bombs set off by the radical Palestinian group Hamas in 1996 are partly to blame for the failure of Israeli Labor Party leader Shimon Peres to get elected and fulfill Rabin’s promise of peace.

Extremist violence does not need to be directed against the other side in order to be effective. A Jewish settler assassinated Rabin, perhaps Israel’s most effective advocate for peaceful coexistence. Palestinian extremists have also murdered fellow Palestinians who pursue coexistence as a legitimate option. Nor do extremists need to act violently to be effective; they can also make unreasonable demands. For example, many believe that Arafat’s insistence on a full right of return for Palestinian refugees to Israeli territory was the breaking point in the July 2000 Camp David talks. Others view Sharon’s insistence on a total cessation of Palestinian violence in order for peace talks to resume as an impossible standard intended specifically to stall further negotiations.

Whatever the method used, the actions of an extreme few seem to successfully undermine compromises that would benefit the majority of both peoples. Such events set off additional rounds of blocking, incitement, and fighting that only serve to build further mistrust and hatred and undermine negotiations.

Systemic Solutions

What does this analysis suggest in terms of systemic solutions to resolve the conflict? I believe that both the protagonists and third parties must:

• Accept that their current solutions are a dead end and hurt themselves—not just the other party.
• Think systemically before taking new action.
• Reduce threats to the other side—and be willing to take risks for peace.
• Reaffirm the goal of peaceful coexistence, reiterating that both sides have rights to live in viable states in former Palestine—and that both grieve the dream of recovering all of the land.
• Expect the international community to hold both sides responsible for their actions—and give up favoring either one.

POSSIBLE LEVERAGE POINTS FOR CHANGE

Successful interventions often involve breaking a link between variables or changing variables. Before beginning to intervene in this long-standing cycle of violence, Palestinians, Israelis, and the international community need to think systemically and accept that current approaches are a dead end.

Accept That Current Solutions Are a Dead End. While some observers do recognize the vicious cycle in which both sides are caught up, most Palestinians and Israelis are unable to see how their own actions hurt their cause. Currently, each side tends to hear the solutions offered by third parties as actions that the other side should take but won’t; thus, current solutions have reached a dead end. By taking a systemic perspective on the ongoing conflict, perhaps each group will be able to see actions it can take in its own best interests. To that end, both Israelis and Palestinians must become aware that:

• They are weakening their own positions through actions that gain them temporary advantage only to leave them more threatened and frustrated in the long term.
• Neither side can succeed in claiming its own right to exist without also having to acknowledge this right for the other.
• Any actions that don’t acknowledge each other’s rights will lead only to greater threats to Israeli security and Palestinian sovereignty—and to greater losses of life and material resources on both sides.
• Because each side is an aggressor as well as a victim, it can do more than it believes, individually and in cooperation with the other party, to change the situation.

Whatever past injustices have led Israelis and Palestinians to this point, in the present they are both responsible for their actions. Both have the opportunity to act in wise ways that ensure a more creative and satisfying future for all. To the extent that each group understands how its actions unwittingly undermine its own cause, they can then initiate and implement more sustainable proposals for peace.

Think Systemically Before Taking New Action. Thinking systemically involves:

1. Testing the underlying mental models that drive so much of people’s behavior.
2. Shifting from the question “Who is to blame?” to “Where is the leverage in the dynamic between the two sides?” Letting go of blame does not necessarily mean letting go of anger, though it does mean finding solutions that create less pain and anger in the future.
3. Asking, “What can we do to break the spiral of retaliation and revenge?” While the vicious cycle is now painfully obvious to both sides, what is less clear is that it can only be broken if each side takes its own initiative to act differently.
4. Considering the unintended consequences of proposed solutions.

Reduce Threats to Both Sides. Instead of being so concerned about whether or not the other side will change (a source of repeated failures to deescalate the conflict), each side needs to focus on what it can do to initiate change. Additionally, before taking any action, each should consider the following questions:

• What are the benefits of our actions in the short term?
• What are the likely consequences of these actions in the long term?
• How will the other side likely react to our actions?
• What will we do when they react?
• Will our actions and their likely reactions produce the outcome we want?

These questions indicate that the first step each party can take in its own best interest is to reduce threats to the other side. In other words, each side must make more efforts to reduce threats on the ground and not limit its actions to discussions at the negotiating table.

Israel can act in ways that demonstrate respect for the Palestinian people without losing sight of its own security needs. This means freezing investment in settlements and reclamation of land where Palestinians live, eliminating acts of harassment and humiliation that do little to bolster security, and allowing Palestinians to move freely as the violence subsides. Palestinians can reduce both violence and incitement while continuing to claim their right to a state with viable borders. They can engage in nonviolent resistance while validating Israel’s right to exist.

Reducing threats not only minimizes defensive reactions, but it softens the mistrust and hatred that have prolonged the conflict. Doing so will likely make both sides feel more comfortable returning to the negotiating table. Once the two sides reach agreement, they then need to keep the promises they make instead of finding loopholes that only lead to further escalation.

At the same time, each side must be prepared to take risks to achieve peace. Israel must not only insist on creating secure borders, but also be willing to risk that it has both the military strength and moral high ground to thoroughly defend Israeli lives and territory within pre-1967 borders. Palestinians must not only insist on a viable state with contiguous borders within the West Bank and Gaza, but also be willing to risk that they can develop their own state effectively and efficiently. While these risks feel very real to both sides, the risks to safety and sovereignty they currently face are untenable.

Reaffirm the Goal of Peaceful Coexistence. Ultimately, any compromise requires that both sides give up their respective dreams of controlling all of Palestine. Making this choice means preparing people on both sides to accept that they will achieve less than what they really want. It means grieving the loss of the dream and claiming the best that this situation has to offer. It means containing the extremists on both sides and not allowing their actions to deter the compromise that benefits the majority of people on both sides. For Israelis, it means preparing to welcome back the settlers who have risked their lives to populate all of “the promised land.” For Palestinians, it means accepting the Jews’ historical claims to this part of the world and setting realistic expectations for Palestinians’ right of return to what is now Israel.

Both sides need to replace the dream of recovering all of the land with a dream of peaceful coexistence. Palestinians can focus on channeling the determination and education of their relatively young population—as well as support from the international community—into peaceful lives, economic well-being, and global respect. Israelis can focus on directing their enormous creativity and energy toward producing environmental, social, and economic advancements that benefit all of its population.

Expect the International Community to Hold Both Sides Responsible. Third parties drawn into the conflict will only be effective when, rather than taking sides, they hold both sides responsible for the conflict and condition their engagement on actions taken by both to resolve it. Third parties can take four additional actions to support peacemaking:

• Validate the pain and anger experienced by both sides without feeding a cycle of blame and revenge. Empathizing with statements such as “This terrible thing happened to me” can lead to true healing, while buying into accusations such as “They did this to me” only supports further helplessness and reactivity.
• Validate people’s belief that any new peace process within the existing framework is likely to fail. The process will fail as long as each side believes it can take the same actions and get a different result or waits for signs that the other side is changing. However, it can succeed if both sides change their own behavior and trust that the other party will do the same.
• Anticipate and explicitly address the pitfalls of entering the peace process. Acknowledge that, historically, negotiations have been weakened by conditions, mixed messages, and broken promises, and that extremists take actions to undermine agreements when peace appears near. Encourage both sides to address these negotiation issues before they become a problem, contain their extremists, and educate their people to refrain from revenge if the extremists strike.
• Be prepared to provide on-the-ground support. Until now, the international community has been reluctant to commit on-the-ground support to help each side keep the agreements. Given current levels of mistrust and hatred, third-party brokers might need to establish a physical presence as well as provide financial aid to achieve the required changes.

Balance of Power?

Some Israeli and Palestinian reviewers of this work have challenged one particular aspect of the analysis—it assumes that both sides have equal power in and responsibility for the current situation. Clearly, Israel has more power militarily and economically, and Palestinians have suffered more in terms of human casualties and economic hardship. I believe, however, that balance exists precisely because neither side has succeeded in eliminating the claims of the other to the land they inhabit. The ongoing impasse suggests that Palestinians’ strengths in terms of determination, armed resistance, and incitement have compensated for what they lack in other resources. Palestinians also have veto power at the negotiating table, which they used pointedly at Camp David.

Both sides also have external supporters and detractors that appear to balance out their respective power. Israel is strongly supported by the U. S., while it’s criticized internationally for not honoring U. N. Resolution 242 recognizing the West Bank as occupied territory. Its neighbors in the Middle East accept its existence only reluctantly, if at all, while some threaten to destroy it. Moreover, global anti-Semitism still exists, as exemplified by a recent U. N. conference on racism that turned into an almost singular attack on Zionism. Palestinians, on the other hand, receive strong verbal encouragement from their Arab neighbors to fight for statehood—even though these same neighbors treat Palestinians poorly in their own countries and often fail to follow through on financial promises. Most of the official money that sustains Palestinians comes from Europe (and ironically from Israel, when it permits Palestinians to work there). Other Arab leaders fear that if Palestinians were to achieve statehood, it might stimulate popular uprisings in their countries—something that these nations do everything to repress.

A systemic viewpoint of the Israeli-Palestinian situation inevitably points to the interdependent and unintentionally self-destructive nature of both sides’ actions. Each party has a role in creating and perpetuating the conflict, and each must take responsibility for doing what it can to resolve it. Becoming aware of how their own actions unwittingly undermine their effectiveness and accepting the limits of what they can create are essential ingredients for both the Palestinians and the Israelis to achieve the security, respect, and sovereignty that each deserve.

David Peter Stroh (davidpstroh@earthlink.net) is a cofounder of Innovation Associates and a charter member of the Society for Organizational Learning.

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