“[T]he emerging world requires a new foreign policy agenda, and fresh faces to execute that agenda. The trouble is, the same old ‘experts’ are still running foreign policy and most of them only dimly understand the world they preside over. Indeed, few people today, in or out of Government, have the background and skills to grasp, let alone direct, the new agenda.”

Reform will not do it; transformations are required, two kinds. First, a transformation of the way nations and international institutions handle global affairs, and second, a transformation in the way systems thinkers collectively conduct the systems movement. The second must come first if we hope to have any effect on the global mess.

Doing the Wrong Thing Right

Reformations and transformations are not the same thing. Reformations are concerned with changing the means systems employ to pursue their objectives. Transformations involve changes in the objectives they pursue. Peter Drucker put this distinction dramatically when he said there is a difference between doing things right (the intent of reformations) and doing the right thing (the intent of transformations). The righter we do the wrong thing, the wronger we become. When we make a mistake doing the wrong thing and correct it, we become wronger. When we make a mistake doing the right thing and correct it, we become righter. Therefore, it is better to do the right thing wrong than the wrong thing right.

This is very significant because almost every problem confronting our society is a result of the fact that our public-policy makers are doing the wrong things and are trying to do them righter. Consider a few examples.

The United States has a higher percentage of its population in prison than any other country, and simultaneously has the highest crime rate. We have more people in prison than are attending college and universities, and it costs more per year to incarcerate them than to educate them. Something is fundamentally wrong.

Almost every problem confronting our society is a result of the fact that our public-policy makers are doing the wrong things and are trying to do them righter.

Most who are imprisoned are subsequently released. As criminologists have shown, those released have a higher probability of committing a crime when they come out than when they went in, and it is likely to be a more serious crime. Prison is a school for learning criminality, not a correctional institution.

In quality, the healthcare system of the United States is ranked 37th by the World Health Organization. We are the only developed country without universal coverage; about 42 million people in our country have no healthcare assured. Moreover, study after study has shown that much of the need for the care that is provided is created by the care that is given: excess surgery, incorrect diagnoses, wrong drugs prescribed or administered, unnecessary tests. The fact is that the so-called healthcare system can survive only as long as there are people who are sick or disabled. Therefore, whatever the intent of its servers, the system can only assure its survival by creating and preserving illness and disability. We have a self-maintaining sickness- and disability-care system, not a healthcare system.

The objectives that must be changed in transformations are not usually those that are proclaimed; rather they are the ones actually pursued. For example, most corporations proclaim maximization of shareholder value as their primary objective. Any objective observer of corporate behavior knows that this is an illusion. As a study conducted a while back at GE showed, the principal objective of corporations is to maximize the security, standard of living, and quality of life of those making the decisions. Recent disclosures at Enron and WorldCom, among others, made this abundantly clear.

A similar discrepancy between objective proclaimed and objective practiced can be observed in most organizations. For example, one could mistakenly believe that the principal objective of universities is to educate students. What a myth! The principal objective of a university is to provide job security and increase the standard of living and quality of life of those members of the faculty and administration who make the critical decisions. Teaching is a price faculty members must pay to share in the benefits provided. Like any price, they try to minimize it. Note that the more senior and politically powerful teaching members of the faculty are, the less teaching they do.

Transforming How We Think

Transformations not only require recognition of the difference between what is practiced and what is preached—a transformation called for years ago by Donald Schön in his book Beyond the Stable State (Random House, 1971)—it also requires a transformation in the way we think. Einstein put it powerfully and succinctly: “Without changing our patterns of thought, we will not be able to solve the problems we created with our current patterns of thought.”

I believe the pattern of thought that is required is systemic. It is difficult if at all possible to reduce the meaning of “systemic thinking” to a brief definition. Nevertheless, I try. Systemic thinking is holistic versus reductionistic thinking, synthetic versus analytic. Reductionistic and analytic thinking derive properties of wholes from the properties of their parts. Holistic and synthetic thinking derive properties of parts from properties of the whole that contains them.

The creation of the department of Homeland Security is a prime example of reductionistic and analytical thinking; the whole formed by the aggregation of existing parts. In contrast, when an architect designs a house, he first sketches the house as a whole and then puts rooms into it. The principal criterion he employs in evaluating a room is what effect it has on the whole. He is even willing to make a room worse if doing so will make the house better.

In general, those who make public policy and engage in public decision making do not understand that improvement in the performance of parts of a system taken separately may not, and usually does not, improve performance of the system as a whole. In fact, it may make system performance worse or even destroy it.

We have not effectively communicated such thoughts to public-policy and decision makers. What should we be communicating to them that would, if heeded, transform our global society into one that is just and equitable, one that would reduce if not eliminate the unequal distribution of wealth, quality of life, and opportunity?

In other words, what should we communicate and be doing that could promote development of the world and its parts by changing the way public policies and decisions are made?

Up to now, those of us in systems have had little or no effect on the global mess. Nevertheless, I believe there is a role that we could play in the dissolution of it. What and how might we contribute to its dissolution? I think we can contribute by making public-policy and decision makers aware of ideas and concepts that would enable them to think more creatively and effectively about the mess the world is in. Here I discuss only a few systemic ideas and processes that I wish they understood. There are many others, but I would settle for their grasping this much.

The ideas and concepts I identify here are familiar to most systems thinkers even if they would express them differently. I include them to call their attention to aspects of systems thinking that I believe they should communicate to public-policy and decision makers.

Development Versus Growth

I hope we can help public-policy and decision makers realize that development and growth are not the same thing. Neither presupposes the other. Rubbish heaps grow but do not develop. Einstein continued to develop long after he stopped growing. Some nations grow larger without developing, and others develop without growing.

Growth is an increase in size or number. Development is an increase in competence, the ability to satisfy one’s needs and desires and those of others. Growth is a matter of earning; development is a matter of learning. Standard of living is an index of national growth; quality of life is an index of its development. Development is not a matter of how much one has but how much one can do with whatever one has. This is why Robinson Crusoe is a better model of development than J. Pierpont Morgan.

The quality of life that an individual or group can achieve obviously depends on both their competence and their wealth. Of two societies with the same level of competence, the one with the most wealth can achieve the higher quality of life. But of two societies with the same resources, the one with the greater competence can achieve a higher quality of life.

Because development is a matter of learning, one cannot do it for another. The only kind of development possible is self-development. However, one can facilitate the development of another by encouraging and supporting their learning. Nations must stop acting as though they can solve other nations’ problems. Nations, like individuals, learn less from the successes of others than from their own mistakes.

One never learns from doing things right because, obviously, one already knows how to do them. What one derives from doing something right is confirmation of what one already knows. This has value, but it is not learning. One can only learn from mistakes, by identifying and correcting them. But all through school and in most places of employment, we are taught that making mistakes is a bad thing. Therefore, we try to hide or deny those we make. To the extent we succeed, we preclude learning.

Furthermore, there are two types of mistakes: errors of commission, doing something we should not have done; and errors of omission, not doing something we should have done. Examination of the failures or crises that organizations and institutions have experienced reveals that errors of omission are the more serious.

For example, in the latter part of the last century, IBM got into serious trouble because it failed to pay attention to the development of small computers, and Kodak got into its current trouble for failing to focus on the development of digital photography until others had successfully staked a claim to it. Our public and private accounting systems record only the less important type of mistake, errors of commission. Therefore, for executives who want to maximize their job security in a public or private organization that deprecates mistakes and ignores errors of omission, the best strategy is to do nothing or as little as possible. This is the root of the conservatism that permeates the world today.

This nation, I believe, has never had an administration as reluctant to acknowledge its errors as the one currently in office. Because of this, it has precluded the possibility of its learning.

Learning About Learning

We need to learn a great deal more about learning. Our schools at all levels are devoted more to teaching than to learning. For example, it is apparent to anyone who has taught others that the teacher learns more than the students do. Teaching is a much better way to learn than being taught. Schools are upside down. Students ought to be teaching and faculty members should be learning how to help others learn and how to motivate them to do so.

A student once stopped me in the hall and asked, “Professor, when did you teach your first class?” That was easy: I answered, “September of 1941.”, “Wow!” he said., “You have been teaching for a very long time.” I agreed. Then he asked, “When was the last time you taught a course in a subject that existed when you were a student?” This question required some thought but finally I got it and answered, “September of 1951.” He said, “Do mean to say that everything you have taught for about 50 years you had to learn without having it taught to you?” I said, “Yes.”, “Wow,” he said again., “You must be a pretty good learner.” I modestly agreed. He continued, “What a pity you are not that good a teacher.”

He had it right: Faculty members know how to learn better than they know how to teach. Therefore, they should be acting as resources to students who are either engaged in teaching others, or learning on their own or with others cooperatively. One of the great gifts I received from West Churchman is that he let me go through graduate school teaching most of the courses I needed to take for graduation.

Democracy has to be learned. It cannot be imposed on others. It must be learned by experiencing it. It does not come to us naturally. All of us are brought up by adults who, even in permissive families, are authorities who control us or set limits within which we have freedom. In effect, we are raised in autocratic structures, however benevolent they may be. Therefore, in a sense autocracy is more natural than democracy.

Systems thinking produces radical and potentially revolutionary visions of public institutions.

I was once involved in a project in Mexico that taught me how democracy could be learned. A group of us from several Mexican universities and a government agency were able to make available to a very remote Indian village in the Sierra Madras Mountains a substantial sum of money the village could use for its development. It alone had to make the decisions as to how to use the money but it had to make these decisions democratically. The only power the team of which I was a part had was to veto any decisions that were not made democratically and that did not involve development. Town meetings were initiated in the square in the center of the village, and after a series of tries, the village members learned how to make decisions democratically. They also learned the difference between development and welfare.

How Do We Have to Change Ourselves?

“[M]an has been able to grow enthusiastic over his vision of . . . unconvincing enterprises. He has pit himself to work for the sake of an idea, seeking by magnificent exertions to arrive at the incredible. And in the end, he has arrived there. Beyond all doubt it is one of the vital sources of man’s power, to be thus able to kindle enthusiasm from the mere glimmer of something improbable, difficult, remote” (José Ortega y Gasset, Mission of the University, Norton, 1966).

Now, what might the systems community do about the deficiencies I have discussed? Clearly, we must learn how through communication to make public-policy and decision makers aware of these deficiencies and what to do about them. We are not doing so now. Most of our communication is addressed to each other, not to public-policy and decision makers. Our communication is based on our needs, not those of others. With the intent of changing this I have several proposals.

First, our principal professional organization, the International Federation for Systems Research, should publish a journal addressed to public policy and decision makers who can affect the global mess. Through expository articles and case studies, the journal should help them come to understand systems thinking and its use in their work. It should be distributed to them at no cost. The federation should cover the cost, if necessary by voluntary contributions of its members.

The journal, possibly called Systems Thinking in Public Affairs, should be supplemented by at least one conference per year held at a site at which a major multi-governmental institution is located. Public-policy and decision makers should be invited mostly to discuss their problems and listen to unconventional systemic approaches to them.

In addition, those of us who think of ourselves as system thinkers should contribute to those publications that are read by those in public life whom we want to affect. We should also try to make presentations at conferences they attend. Our professional societies should make it their responsibility to facilitate such participation by informing us of relevant opportunities and, where possible, by arranging jointly sponsored meetings.

Finally, we should engage in assisting development efforts of less developed countries, regions, communities, and neighborhoods. This does not mean imposing our solutions on them but assisting them in implementing their proposed solutions to their problems, even if they are wrong. They can develop more by making their own mistakes than by imitating our successes.

Systems thinking produces radical and potentially revolutionary visions of public institutions. Nothing short of such visions can transform the state of world affairs. I believe we have an obligation to the global society of which we are a part to make every possible effort to bring about a radical transformation of that society into one in which our children do not have to contend with the mess we have created and are exacerbating.

Russell L. Ackoff is Anheuser-Busch Professor Emeritus of Management Science at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of Business. He is an architect, city planner, doctor of philosophy, trailblazer in systems theory, best-selling author, distinguished professor, and head of his own management education and consulting firm. Two of his book.

This paper was originally presented at the 3rd International Conference on Systems Thinking in Management, May 19, 2004. The conference was cohosted by the Ackoff Center for the Advancement of Systems Approaches and the Association for Enterprise Integration.

The post Transforming the Systems Movement appeared first on The Systems Thinker.

Barry’s death left a gap in the field of system dynamics as well. As the founder of High Performance Systems (now isee systems) and the driving force behind the popular ithink® and STELLA® systems thinking–based software products, he made computer modeling accessible to people in business and education. At his memorial service, several speakers commented on what Barry’s life had meant to them. Peter Senge spoke about both the importance and the incompleteness of Barry’s work, noting that it was “up to us” to continue this important effort.

Since Barry’s death, I have spent a lot of time reflecting on his life and contribution to the field of system dynamics. In this article, I identify five operating principles that guided Barry’s work, especially in the realm of public policy. These principles are also applicable in business, education, and other areas of inquiry. By way of summary, I also offer a few thoughts about the nature of Barry’s legacy and how we might build on that legacy.

A Broad-Brush Conceptual Framework

To gain a deep understanding of Barry’s work, it is first necessary to have some sense for where he was coming from. What motivated his activities? What were his ideas regarding the real value of system dynamics?

The framework, tools, and language of system dynamics should be accessible to all. Anyone can do this at some level, and everyone should try!

Fortunately, Barry left a good paper trail that documents his thinking. For example, the STELLA and ithink user guides (HPS, 2003) do an excellent job of presenting Barry’s view on how to “do” system dynamics. In The “Thinking” in Systems Thinking: Seven Essential Skills (Pegasus Communications, 2000), Barry identified the key competencies behind the effective practice of systems thinking.

These resources shed light on Barry’s fundamental belief, which provided the motivating force for many of his professional endeavors. I like to phrase it this way:

“The framework, tools, and language of system dynamics should be accessible to all. Anyone can do this at some level, and everyone should try!”

This belief is an assertion that the primary value of system dynamics comes from the process not the products of that process (although Barry would readily agree that products were important, too!). It’s also an assertion that as more people use the framework, language, and tools of systems thinking and system dynamics to generate insight—and act accordingly —the more likely we will be to solve the big problems facing the world today.

Over the time that I collaborated with Barry, this deeply held assumption was never very far out of sight. It would often come to the surface in the context of a formal presentation, essay, or paper. Consider, for example, Barry’s contribution to the 1985 System Dynamics conference in Keystone, Colorado, in which he introduced the STELLA software. The paper he presented was entitled “STELLA: Software for Bringing System Dynamics to the Other 98%.” The title clearly reflects Barry’s fundamental belief that everyone should be using these tools.

Or consider the paper Barry presented at the 1994 conference in Sterling, Scotland, provocatively titled, “System Dynamics/Systems Thinking: Let’s Just Get On With It.” In the paper, Barry asserts that system dynamics is “quite unique, quite powerful, and quite broadly useful as a way of thinking and/or learning. It’s also capable of being quite transparent —leveraging the way we learn biology, manage our businesses, or run our personal lives.”

Barry devoted a huge part of his life to turning this deeply held belief into reality, through a variety of products and services, including software, learning environments, workshops, and specific client deliverables. The common theme in these efforts was increasing the base of people who could partake in the process of gaining value by doing system dynamics.

A simple graphic that Barry and I developed for use in our workshops gives a clear picture of what he saw as the relative value of investing in various levels of analysis (see “The Return on Investment of System Dynamics”).

It relates effort or time expended to the value or utility that one can expect to derive from that effort. As the curve shows, there is significant value to be gained from simple “conversational” uses of the fundamental thinking skills. Examples would include drawing a behavior over time graph to cast a problem in dynamic terms, characterizing an issue in generic terms in order to recognize patterns over time, or asking operational questions such as “how does this work?” (For details about the different systems thinking and system dynamics tools referenced in this article, go to www.pegasuscom.com/lrnmore.html and click on a term or topic.)

Another jump in value/utility can come at relatively low cost from creating a simple stock and flow map. A third increase in value can be added, again at relatively low cost in terms of time or effort, by transforming a map into a computer-based simulation model, perhaps with a simple interface to facilitate controlled experimentation.

Note that, once you move past simpler applications, diminishing returns can quickly begin to set in. In our experience, as the complexity of the model increases, the amount of effort, skill, and time required to underwrite that complexity increases disproportionately relative to the amount of value derived! Out at the end of the curve, adding complexity may well result in negative returns. The implication: You don’t need to build huge, complex models in order to derive value. Simple, straightforward uses of the framework, language and tools can add significant value at relatively low investment!

Five Principles

This section distills what I believe are key principles that guided Barry’s public policy efforts. The principles fall into three broad categories, associated with the three activities that Barry viewed as fundamental to any modeling effort:

THE RETURN ON INVESTMENT OF SYSTEM DYNAMICS

There is significant value to be gained at relatively low cost from the application of basic system dynamics skills. Once you move past simpler applications, diminishing returns can quickly set in. As the complexity of the model increases, the amount of effort, skill, and time required to underwrite that complexity increases disproportionately relative to the amount of value derived!

Building

1. The Principle of Operational Thinking
2. The Principle of Irreducible Essence

Simulating

3. The Principle of Controlled Experimentation

Communicating

4. The Principle of Mental Model Confrontation
5. The Principle of Controversial Topics

1. The Principle of Operational Thinking This principle was at the bedrock of Barry’s work. Barry himself viewed operational thinking as the key thinking skill required for the effective application of system dynamics.

Operational thinking entails getting to the essence of how a process works. It involves asking questions about key accumulations, or stocks, and flows in the system. For example, “What is being produced?”, “How is this activity generated?”, “What resources are consumed in the process of generating the flow?” These are questions about the physical relationships among different parts of a dynamics system that work together to determine its dynamic behavior. The effort is one of building understanding of how it works rather than simply listing the factors that influence the process.

The benefit of operational thinking is that it facilitates the identification of levers for changing system performance. If you have a clear picture of how the process works, you are in a solid position to ask focused questions about alternate proposed policy interventions and more accurately think through the implications of a proposed initiative. If, on the other hand, your thinking simply results in a laundry list of factors that influence the process, your efforts to identify levers for actually changing performance may well be limited.

Barry used an excellent illustration of operational thinking in his presentation at the 2001 Pegasus Conference. This event took place shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Issues associated with international terrorism were very much on the minds of participants at the conference. One part of a storytelling progression within Barry’s presentation is shown in “The Inflows and Outflows of Terrorism” on p. 4.

This stock and flow map nicely captures the essence of the processes through which people become terrorists, and through which terrorist activity is generated. Note the salient features:

• The number of terrorists is represented by a stock; terrorist activity is represented as a flow. From this map, you can identify two fundamental ways to reduce terrorist activity: Either reduce the number of terrorists or make terrorists less productive.
• The options for directly attacking the problem are clearly mapped (eliminating terrorists, eliminating supporters, and implementing defensive initiatives).
• The diagram captures both the inflows and the outflows to the terrorist stock; that is, the factors that lead people to become terrorists as well as those that cause them to stop their activities. In so doing, it identifies the levers for long-term improvement in the performance of the system.

THE INFLOWS AND OUTFLOWS OF TERRORISM

The diagram captures both the inflows and the outflows to the terrorist stock; that is, the factors that lead people to become terrorists as well as those that cause them to stop their activities. In so doing, it identifies the levers for long-term improvement in the performance of the system.

2. The Principle of Irreducible Essence This principle is a variation of “Keep it simple, stupid.” Einstein worded this tenet as:, “A good explanation is one that is as simple as possible, but not simpler.” Occam’s razor is another version:, “A simple explanation is to be favored over a more complex one.” These views, along with the principle of irreducible essence, recognize that we must simplify in order to make sense of the world—it’s impossible to hold all the relationships that exist in our heads. The challenge is to preserve the relevant essence of that part of the world upon which we wish to act in our models.

The usefulness of this principle is twofold. First, it enforces a mental discipline that can lead to improved clarity about an issue. Second, irreducible essence leads to explanations that are accessible to both experts and nonexperts on a given topic. As a result, following this principle can lead to a significantly larger audience of people who can derive value from the effort.

Barry’s “Stories of the Month,” published on the HPS web site 2001–2003, provided many examples of the principle of irreducible essence in practice. These stories typically used a simple stock and flow map or a small simulation model to provide a systems perspective on current events in the news. A story that Barry was working on at the time of his death, entitled “Hot Air and Greenhouse Gases,” was motivated by some sloppy statements about global warming coming out of the White House in the summer of 2002. Among other things, these statements contended that the president had a plan that would reduce greenhouse emissions while sustaining economic growth. The implicit claim was that this plan would result in a reversal of global warming trends.

In response to these statements, Barry could have developed an elaborate model of greenhouse gases, or he could have pointed people to large, detailed models produced by others on the topic. Instead, he began working on a simple model and story (see “Growth, Gases, and Warming”).

This diagram is stark in its simplicity. It provides just enough of the relevant essence of the issue to get at the dynamics of the greenhouse effect. It includes just enough structure to facilitate investigation of the interaction between reduced greenhouse emissions (for example, through “green technology”) and increases in the level of economic activity that serves as the base for generating greenhouse emissions.

3. The Principle of Controlled Experimentation The principle of controlled experimentation entails making changes in a model one at a time to learn why it behaves in a particular way under particular conditions. Through such controlled experiments, users build understanding of the connections between structure (how the process is put together) and behavior (how it performs over time). They can compare their assumptions about the situation to the computer simulation and modify their mental models in response to what they learn.

Simple, controlled experiments can also create the activity basis for building shared understanding. A sequence of controlled experiments can yield extremely productive conversations, particularly when participants compare the results of the experiments to what they had predicted would happen. They can then discuss differences of opinion, identify commonalities of thought, and surface tacit assumptions.

Less directly, controlled experiments build an individual’s capacity to accurately trace dynamics and to make structural/behavioral connections. Barry was a firm believer that humans aren’t very good at doing mental simulations of anything except the simplest of systems. Nevertheless, he believed that people could build their capacity to play out dynamics in their heads through sustained practice. Indeed, this was one of the motivations behind the “Story of the Month” concept.

Many of the stories reflected the principle of controlled experimentation, including the first one that HPS produced. This story came about because Barry was in California at the time of the run-up in energy prices that took place in April 2001. Everywhere he went, he read news articles about organizations that planned to pass on increased energy prices to consumers. This practice raised an interesting systems question: Is it possible for everyone to pass on costs? Or is there some self-limiting process at work?

We developed a simple story to address the issue. The first part of the story looks at what producers do in response to a step-increase in energy costs. In the model, a simple balancing process is at work. In an experiment with a step-increase in energy costs, producer profits initially decrease. Producers then raise prices in order to bring profitability back to desired levels. When taken in isolation, this balancing process keeps profits at desired levels by passing on increased energy costs to consumers.

The next part of the story involves expanding the model boundary just a bit, to consider what consumers do in response. For consumers, an increase in prices means a decrease in purchasing power. This in turn can lead to upward pressure on wages. It’s another balancing process. This loop works to keep purchasing power in line with desired levels by driving wages upward.

It’s important to note, however, that wages are a cost to producers, and so an increase in wages can undermine producer profitability. In an experiment with the expanded model, a step-increase in energy costs leads to price increases, which causes wages to increase, which creates a further round of price increases! A reinforcing feedback process, latent within the structure of the system, underwrites a wage-price spiral!

By using controlled experiments in a simple progression, it’s possible to build understanding, stimulate good conversations, and strengthen mental simulation muscles.

GROWTH, GASES, AND WARMING

This diagram facilitates investigation of the interaction between greenhouse emissions and the level of economic activity that serves as the base for generating those emissions.

4. The Principle of Mental Model Confrontation Like the principle of controlled experimentation, the principle of mental model confrontation is simple but powerful. The premise? Whenever possible, bring the prevailing mental model to the surface of the discussion. Explore the dynamic implications of that mental model. Then, provide an alternative mental model (often in the form of a stock and flow diagram) that offers richer explanations, more robust policy propositions, or improved insight into the issue at hand.

The process of confronting the default mental model is a key part of creating a compelling case for changed behavior—often the desired outcome of work in public policy. When there are multiple, conflicting mental models, the principle of mental model confrontation can be used to facilitate communication among key stakeholders. There’s learning to be had from systematically comparing, testing, and evaluating underlying assumptions!

In late September 2001, Barry put together a “Story of the Month” on terrorism. This story nicely illustrates the principle of mental model confrontation. In it, Barry begins by “surfacing the mental model underly- ing [the rhetoric of the Bush administration in response to the September 11 attacks, for example, ‘leading the world to victory in a war against terrorism’] so you can critically examine its implicit assumptions.”

Next, Barry builds upon this simple mental model to offer a critique of the prevailing thinking. This richer structure—very similar to the one he developed for the 2001 Pegasus Conference—sheds light on longer-term difficulties for the “war on terrorism.” Over the long haul, a reinforcing loop associated with the terrorist recruiting process, as turbocharged by increasing anger at US-led actions, can lead to a rapid growth in both the number of terrorists and the frequency of terrorist acts.

Later in this story, Barry offers a systems thinking–based alternative to looking at the situation. The alternative consists of two components: a defensive component that minimizes current threats, and an offensive component that gets to what Barry sees as the root cause of terrorism. Building it up a piece at a time, Barry ends up with a map that shifts from a focus on “winning the war” to building tolerance of another’s viewpoint, managing anger, defusing hatred, and maybe even adjusting one’s position. By initially confronting the mental model that appeared to be prevalent in the Bush administration, Barry presents a systems thinking– based alternative.

5. The Principle of Controversial Topics This principle flows directly out of Barry’s deeply held view that anyone could (and should be able to) use the language, framework, and tools of system dynamics in a productive way. He believed strongly that an informed layperson could generate insight into any topic of interest. For Barry, controversial or “hot” topics were especially important to pursue, because they’re often the most confusing or perplexing, and therefore have the most potential for benefiting from the use of system dynamics!

I’ve interspersed several of these controversial topics through this paper. To make the point very clearly, I’ll introduce one more issue that Barry tackled in his “Story of the Month” series. In response to the tragedy at Columbine High School and at other schools in the United States, Barry put together the “Guns at School” story. He wrote, “Until we have a solid grip on the relationships responsible for producing and maintaining this scary phenomenon, we have scant hope of doing much to effectively address it.” His story was an effort to come to grips with these relationships.

The story begins with a brief history of gun-related school violence and then incrementally develops a stock and flow map that seeks to explain the phenomenon. The map depicts the progressive build-up of alienation and rage, relating these emotions to the acquisition and use of guns within a student population.

Against this backdrop, Barry developed a set of policy-based experiments around three kinds of potential actions: gun-related initiatives (such as improved screening of gun purchasers, disarming students with guns, and restricting student access to guns), media initiatives (anti-copycat practices that limit news about school shootings), and student coping skills initiatives (trainings in rage, alienation, and humiliation management).

Barry’s real legacy in public policy work resides in the mindset along with the principles that he employed.

Readers are prompted first to conduct one-at-a-time controlled experiments with different interventions. Then, in a second round, they are encouraged to create a “policy cocktail” to find the most effective set of interventions. The intent of these experiments is to provoke thought and stimulate discussion by exploring the relationships that drive this pressing social issue. Is the topic controversial? Yes! Is the story helpful in shedding light? Absolutely!

Barry’s Legacy

Barry did not have a huge publication record in the realm of public policy. Most of his work was done in the context of client work or, more recently, in presentations of the “Story of the Month” column. I do not think that Barry’s work, by itself, is where his legacy resides. Rather, as befitting the teacher that he was, Barry’s real legacy in public policy work resides in the mindset along with the principles that he employed.

For those of us who wish to carry on the work, I believe that there is much to glean from this legacy. For me, the primary lessons are:

• Maybe not everyone can apply system dynamics to public policy issues, but there is a large population of people who could derive value, at some level, who currently are not. Those people need access to systems tools, concepts, and frameworks.
• Most people/organizations are on the steep part of the effort/value curve. They therefore can derive significant value from conversational uses of system dynamics, simple stock and flow maps, and simple models with interfaces.
• The five principles aren’t rocket science—although there is some art associated with their application. I have found them helpful guideposts for my own work. You may find them useful as you seek to apply systems thinking in practical ways in your own context.

While it is beyond my ken to consider how one might replace someone like Barry, I believe that it is possible to carry on his work. It will require sustained effort and application, but it can be achievable. The world will be better for our efforts to do so.

Steve Peterson (steve@evans-peterson.com) is an independent consultant based in West Lebanon, NH, where his work focuses on the practical application of system dynamics across a broad range of application areas. Before starting his own practice, he worked closely with Barry Richmond, both at Dartmouth College and at High Performance Systems, Inc., where he was an integral part of the development team responsible for the ithink® and STELLA® software products.

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